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When people forecast, they often use analogies, but in an unstructured manner. We propose a structured 
judgmental procedure that involves asking experts to list as many analogies as they can, rate how similar 
the analogies are to the target situation, and match the outcomes of the analogies with possible outcomes 
of the target. An administrator would then derive a forecast from the experts’ information. We compared 
structured analogies with unaided judgments for predicting the decisions made in eight conflict situations. 
These were difficult forecasting problems; the 32% accuracy of the unaided experts was only slightly 
better than chance. In contrast, 46% of structured-analogies forecasts were accurate. Among experts who 
were independently able to think of two or more analogies and who had direct experience with their 
closest analogy, 60% of forecasts were accurate. Collaboration did not improve accuracy.  
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  2It seems natural to use analogies when making decisions or forecasts as, by definition, they contain 
information about how people have behaved in similar situations in the past. For example, Breuning 
(2003) found that one-third of testimony at the Senate hearing on proposals for the first U.S. program for 
development aid was based on analogies. Khong (1992) concluded that most of the decisions made early 
in the Vietnam War were based on forecasts derived from analogies. Indeed, Kokinov (2003, p. 168) 
asserts “…we may explain human behavior by assuming that decisions are made by analogy with 
previous cases…”. In the belief that such information is useful, MIT professor Lincoln P. Bloomfield has 
developed a historical database of post-World War II conflicts (web.mit.edu/cascon) in order to help 
policy analysts and others identify appropriate analogies.  
 
We agree that information about analogies should be useful for forecasting, but we suspect that without 
structure people will often chose inferior analogies. They will tend to choose analogies that are easy for 
them to recall. The approach is called the availability heuristic by Tversky and Kahneman (1973). When 
people use the heuristic, they judge an outcome as likely if it matches the modal outcome of readily-
recalled similar situations. Where recalling analogous situations is onerous, one analogy may suffice; 
particularly if it confirms prior beliefs. For example, when the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
approved a new oil refinery in Eastport, Maine, decision makers relied on the analogy of Milford Haven 
in the U.K (Stewart and Leschine 1986). The EPA decision makers considered Milford Haven was the 
most comparable site, and looked no further, but Stewart and Leschine observed that Milford Haven had 
not been in operation long enough to provide evidence that it was safe. They were right. The supertanker 
Sea Empress ran aground near Milford Haven on 15 February, 1996, spilling 70,000 tonnes of crude oil 
(Canada Centre for Remote Sensing 1996).  
 
Neustadt and May (1986) described how inappropriate selection and inadequate analysis of analogies led 
U.S. government decision makers to make poor forecasts of the decisions of other governments’ leaders. 
Drawing on their litany of poor decisions by political leaders, they described an elaborate structured 
  3approach to analyzing current and historical information that they suggested should lead to a more 
effective use of experts’ knowledge and hence to improved prediction. Many areas of judgmental decision 
making and forecasting have shown that structured judgmental processes make more effective use of the 
information people possess. This occurs, for example, when people are asked explicitly to decompose a 
problem (MacGregor, 2001). More generally, Armstrong (1985, Chapter 6) summarizes evidence that 
structured methods of judgmental forecasting are more accurate than unstructured ones. A structured 
approach to forecasting with analogies, then, might encourage experts to consider more information on 
analogies, and to process it in an effective way. 
 
Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) report an anecdote that illustrates how inducing an expert to use analogies 
in a structured way can affect predictions. Kahneman had worked with a small team of academics to 
design a new judgmental decision making curriculum for Israeli high schools. He asked each team 
member to predict the number of months it would take them to prepare a proposal for the Ministry of 
Education. Predictions ranged from 18 to 30 months. Kahneman then turned to a member of the team who 
had considerable experience developing new curricula and asked him to think of analogous projects. After 
some consideration, the man stated that, among the many analogous situations he could recall, about 40% 
of the teams eventually gave up. Of those that completed the task, he said, none did so in less than seven 
years. Furthermore, he thought that the present team was probably below average in terms of resources 
and potential. In the event, the project took eight years to complete.  
 
We were unable to identify a theory relevant to our expectation that better predictions would result from a 
structured approach to analyzing analogous data. Reviewers and colleagues were not able to help us. In 
retrospect, this is not so surprising as if such a theory was in common currency, researchers would likely 
already have proposed or performed tests. 
 
  4Procedure for forecasting with structured analogies  
Because the literature provides no evidence on how to structure forecasting with analogies, we started 
with a simple procedure. If analogies are useful, it is because they are similar to a target. Imposing 
structure on experts’ assessments of similarity should encourage more complete processing of 
information and reduction of biases. We also wanted a procedure that would be easy for experts to use. At 
a minimum then, a structured approach to using analogies for forecasting requires experts to identify 
analogies and the outcomes they imply for the target, and to assess the analogies’ similarity to the target 
in a structured way. Our structured analogies procedure involves five steps, two of which involve experts 
analyzing analogies. The administrator (1) describes the target situation, and (2) selects experts; the 
experts each (3) identify and describe analogies, and (4) rate similarity; the administrator (5) derives 
forecasts. 
 
(1) Describe the target situation 
The administrator prepares an accurate, comprehensive, and brief description. To do so, the administrator 
should seek advice either from unbiased experts or from experts with opposing biases. When feasible, 
include a list of possible outcomes for the target situation to make coding easier. 
 
(2) Select experts 
The administrator recruits experts who are likely to know about situations that are similar to the target 
situation. The administrator should decide how many experts to recruit based on how much knowledge 
they have about analogous situations, the variability in responses among experts, and the importance of 
obtaining accurate forecasts. Drawing upon the research on the desirable number of forecasts to combine, 
we suggest enlisting the help of at least five experts (Armstrong, 2001).  
 
  5(3) Identify and describe analogies 
Ask the experts to describe as many analogies as they can without considering the extent of the similarity 
to the target situation.  
 
(4) Rate similarity 
Ask the experts to list similarities and differences between their analogies and the target situation, and 
then to rate the similarity of each analogy to the target. We suggest providing a scale against which the 
experts can rate the similarity of their analogies. Ask them to match their analogies’ outcomes with target 
outcomes. 
 
(5) Derive forecasts 
To promote logical consistency and replicability, the administrator should decide on the rules to derive a 
forecast from experts’ analogies. Many rules are reasonable to use. For example, one could select the 
analogy that the expert rated as most similar to the target and adopt the outcome implied by that analogy 
as the forecast.  
 
Hypotheses 
We examined predictive validity using conflicts. Prior research has shown that the method currently used 
for making predictions for conflicts, unaided judgment, produces inaccurate forecasts (see, for example, 
Green 2002). We hypothesized that forecasts derived from experts’ structured analysis of analogies would 
be more accurate than forecasts by experts who used their unaided judgment.  
 
Our structured analogies procedure is based on the assumption that while unaided experts can provide 
useful information, they are not good at processing complex information reliably. For that reason, we did 
not rely on the experts to make forecasts but instead used a rule. On the other hand, perhaps experts’ 
understanding of their own analogies might enable them to forecast more accurately than we could by 
  6using rules. To test this aspect of our procedure, we asked our experts to predict the decision made in the 
target situation after they had described and rated their analogies. 
 
Does it help if experts collaborate and discuss analogies with others? Collaboration could help experts to 
produce more analogies and flesh out the details, or it could hinder them by suppressing their creativity 
and search. Both positions are reasonable, so we had no prior hypothesis on collaboration. We asked 
some experts to collaborate with others, and all experts were asked to report the number of people they 
discussed the forecasting problem with. 
 
Prior evidence 
We searched for evidence on methods for forecasting with analogies. Schrodt (2002) searched for 
empirical evidence on the accuracy of forecasts for decisions in conflicts in the foreign policy arena. He 
found no evidence on the accuracy of forecasts based on analogies relative to that of forecasts based on 
any other method. 
 
In a marketing study, McIntyre, Achabal and Miller (1993) tested a procedure called case-based 
reasoning, which is a way to structure analogies, for forecasting sales during sales promotions. When 
tested on two products, the forecasts were no more accurate than those of an expert buyer. 
 
We conducted a further search for evidence by using the Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI) for the 
period 1978 to August 24, 2004 using the terms “analogies” and “forecasting,” and then “analogies” and 
“prediction.” We searched the Internet on August 24, 2004 using Google™ and the terms “comparative”, 
“forecasting,” “prediction,” “accuracy,” and “analogies”. We conducted similar searches on JSTOR. In 
November 2001, we sent e-mail appeals to the 278 members of the International Institute of Forecasters 
list server and to the 579 members of the Judgment and Decision Making mailing list. We also contacted 
key researchers. The only relevant study we uncovered was Buehler, Griffin, and Ross’s (1994). The 
  7authors asked 123 participants to estimate how long it would take to complete a computer assignment. 
Their predictions, made using unaided judgment, were inaccurate as they were overly optimistic. 
Participants who had been asked to think of analogous situations were less biased, especially when they 
described how the analogies related to the assignment. As a consequence, proportionately twice as many 
of those who recalled analogies finished their assignments before their estimated completion times. 
 
In sum, prior to the research we describe here, little evidence was available on the accuracy of forecasts 
based on the use of analogies relative to the accuracy of forecasts made using other methods. 
Furthermore, no prior evidence exists on the use of structured analogies. 
 
Procedures used for the study  
Preparing materials 
We compiled descriptions of conflicts, including brief descriptions of the roles of the parties involved in 
the conflict. The conflict descriptions were accounts of real situations. We abstracted all but one (Personal 
Grievance) from mass media reports or experts’ accounts. The lead author developed the Personal 
Grievance from information collected in interviews and from exchanges of e-mail messages with the 
parties involved in the dispute. In the case of Nurses Dispute, he gathered information from published 
sources (Langdon, 2000a; 2000b; 2000c; Radio New Zealand, 2000a; 2000b; 2000c) and by interviewing 
representatives of the two disputant parties. When we considered it necessary, we disguised the conflicts 
that had already occurred to reduce the chance that our participants would know the outcomes. As a 
precaution, we asked our experts whether they recognized the situations. In eight cases, experts correctly 
identified a conflict, and their responses were eliminated.  
 
In all, we used eight conflict situations in our research. We provided between three and six possible 
outcome options for each of them (Table 1). Our descriptions were short, running to no more than two 
pages. The full descriptions are provided at conflictforecasting.com. [For reviewers, descriptions are 
  8attached as Reviewer Appendix 1 and outcome options as Reviewer Appendix 2.] The materials, identity 




Artists protest: Members of a rich nation’s artists’ union occupied a major gallery and demanded 
generous financial support from their government. What will be the final resolution of the artists’ sit-in? 
(6 options) 
Distribution channel: An appliance manufacturer proposed to a supermarket chain a novel arrangement 
for retailing its wares. Will the management of the supermarket chain agree to the plan? (3 options) 
55% Pay plan: Professional sports players demanded a 55% share of gross revenues and threatened to go 
on strike if the owners didn’t concede. Will there be a strike and, if so, how long will it last? (4 options) 
Nurses dispute: Angry nurses increased their pay demand and threatened more strike action after 
specialist nurses and junior doctors received big increases. What will the outcome of their negotiations 
be? (3 options) 
Personal grievance: An employee demanded a meeting with a mediator when her job was downgraded 
after her new manager re-evaluated it. What will be the outcome of the meeting? (4 options) 
Telco takeover: An acquisitive telecommunications provider, after rejecting a seller’s mobile business 
offer, made a hostile bid for the whole corporation. How will the standoff between the companies be 
resolved? (4 options) 
Water dispute: Troops from neighboring nations moved to their common border, and the downstream 
nation threatened to bomb the upstream nation’s new dam. Will the upstream neighbor agree to release 
additional water and, if not, how will the downstream nation’s government respond? (3 options) 
Zenith investment: Under political pressure, a large manufacturer evaluated an investment in expensive 
new technology. How many new manufacturing plants will it decide to commission? (3 options) 
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Selecting experts 
To select experts, we sent e-mail messages to ten public list servers, two organizations’ e-mail lists, the 
faculty of a university political science department, and a convenience sample of 15 experts. We chose 
lists that were likely to include high proportions of experts on conflicts or on judgmental forecasting. We 
took additional steps to ensure people were suitably qualified for these tasks. In our appeals, which were 
personalized when possible, the lead author wrote “I am writing to you because you are an expert…” and 
“I am engaged in a research project on the accuracy of different methods for predicting the outcomes of 
conflicts…” (Appendix A). We sent only descriptions of conflicts that were likely to be relevant to the 
particular recipients. For example, we did not send a situation dealing with a proposed new marketing 
channel to experts in employment relationship disputes. Most importantly, we counted on people to 
recognize when they had expertise on a topic.  
 
We sent as many as three reminders. Details of the lists and participation are provided at 
conflictforecasting.com. [For the purpose of review, the details are attached as Reviewer Appendix 3.] 
 
Using the methods 
In our e-mail appeal, we gave experts instructions on how to participate (Appendix A). For structured-
analogies participants, our one-page questionnaires asked the experts to (1) describe each analogous 
situation; (2) describe their source of knowledge about it; (3) list similarities and differences compared to 
the target conflict; and (4) provide an overall similarity rating (where 0 = no similarity… 5 = similar…10 
= high similarity). Finally, we asked the experts to select (from a list of possible outcomes that we 
prepared for each target conflict) the outcome closest to the outcome of their analogy. To illustrate, a 
completed structured-analogies treatment questionnaire for one of the conflicts, Telco Takeover is 
provided as Appendix B.  
 
  10Questionnaires for unaided-judgment participants first asked them to select the outcome they thought 
would occur. We gave them the same lists of possible outcomes that we gave to the structured-analogies 
participants. 
 
We varied the order in which we attached the conflict documents to our e-mail appeals. To test our 
hypotheses, with our appeals we sought responses for each of the following treatments:    
  1. unaided judgment (no instructions on how to forecast) without collaboration, 
  2. unaided judgment with collaboration,  
  3. structured analogies without collaboration,  
  4. structured analogies with collaboration. 
 
For our first appeal, we sent equal numbers of each treatment to members of the International Association 
of Conflict Management mailing list. The structured-analogies and collaboration treatments were more 
onerous for participants than unaided judgment, so we obtained relatively few responses for those 
treatments. As a consequence, in most of our subsequent appeals we sought responses for structured 
analogies with collaboration. Finally, we sought responses for combinations of conflict and treatment for 
which we needed more forecasts. Because we were seeking participants for their expertise, rather than as 
part of a representative sample of some larger group, random assignment to treatments was unnecessary. 
The form of collaboration was at the discretion of the participants. 
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Coding responses 
We obtained two groups of unaided-judgment forecasts from experts. One was from the unaided-
judgment treatment (62 forecasts), and the other from experts who were asked to use structured analogies 
but could think of no analogies (44 forecasts). We analyzed results separately for each group and the 
forecasts were similar; the latter group’s being somewhat more accurate. We combined the two groups 
under the title “unaided judgment” for our analyses, reasoning that neither of these groups used structured 
analyses and that our action favored unaided judgment relative to the structured analogies method. 
 
For each conflict, we derived a structured-analogies forecast from each expert’s analogy information, 
where the information was available. It is trivial to derive a forecast from analogies information when an 
expert provides a single analogy. On the other hand, many mechanical schemes could be used to derive a 
forecast when an expert provides information on more than one analogy. To obtain a forecast, we selected 
the target conflict outcome implied by the analogy given the highest similarity rating by the expert. Our 
reasoning was that predictive validity should increase with relative similarity. Where there was a tie, we 
selected the outcome that had the most support from the expert’s analysis of analogies. (Details on the 
rules for determining support are provided at conflictforecasting.com). [For the purpose of review, details 
of the rules are attached as Reviewer Appendix 4.] Given our uncertainties about the best procedure, we 
subsequently analyzed other mechanical schemes. 
 
We asked a convenience sample of five people who knew the actual outcomes of the conflicts to rate the 
outcome options we provided to the research participants. The raters were told that an option that matched 
the actual outcome of a conflict should be given a rating of 10. Forecasts were counted as accurate if the 
outcome option chosen by our rule was the option that had been given the highest median rating by our 
raters. Outcome options were unconditional statements of decisions and did not specify timing, for 
example, “Expander’s takeover succeeded at, or close to, their August 14 offer price of $43-per-share.”  
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Results 
As Tetlock (1999) demonstrated, it is difficult for experts to forecast decisions made in conflicts 
situations. He found that forecasts by 20 experts of the outcomes of foreign-policy conflicts were no more 
accurate than could be expected from chance. Our results were similar. Our 66 unaided experts were 
correct for 32% of predictions in an unweighted average across the eight conflicts (Table 2).  
 
As hypothesized, forecasts from structured analogies were more accurate. They were more accurate for 
seven of the eight conflicts. Averaging the accuracy figures across the conflicts, structured-analogies 
forecasts were 46% accurate (P = 0.04, one-tailed permutation test for paired replicates; Siegel and 
Castellan 1988). We used the permutation test for paired replicates to compare the differences in the 
percentage of correct forecasts between the two methods for each conflict (e.g., for Artists Protest, the 
difference between structured analogies and unaided judgment was 17%). Viewed another way, structured 




                                                 
1 We calculate average error reduction figures as {(100 – AC) – (100 – AX)} / (100 – AC) * 100, where AC 
is the unweighted average percentage accuracy across conflicts of the comparison forecasts (or chance) 
and AX is the corresponding figure for the forecasts of interest.    
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Accuracy of structured-analogies  
and unaided-judgment forecasts by experts  
Percent correct forecasts 
a (number of forecasts)  
  Chance Unaided 
judgment 
  Structured 
   analogies 
  Telco Takeover  25  0 (8)  8 (12) 
  Artists Protest  17  10 (20)  27 (11) 
  55% Pay Plan  25  18 (11)  57 (14) 
  Personal Grievance  25  31 (13)  36 (14) 
  Zenith Investment  33  36 (14)  38 (8) 
  Distribution Channel  33  38 (17)  50 (12) 
  Water Dispute  33  50 (8)  92 (12) 
  Nurses Dispute  33  73 (15) 57 (14) 
Averages (unweighted)   28 32 (106) 46 (97) 
a Bold figures denote the most accurate forecasts for each 
conflict, and overall. 
 
 
Value of experts’ experience 
We tested whether structured-analogies forecasts were more accurate when they came from experts with 
more experience than when from those with less. We used two measures: (1) we asked our experts how 
many years experience they had as “a conflict management specialist,” and (2) we asked them to rate their 
experience (on a scale from 0 to 10) with situations similar to the target conflict. 
 
  14Structured-analogies forecasts from experts with five or more years experience as conflict management 
specialists were less accurate (average across conflicts) with 21% error reduction compared to chance, 
than those with less experience (26% error reduction). Furthermore, where experts gave high ratings to 
their experience with similar conflicts their forecasts were less accurate (16% error reduction) than where 
they gave themselves lower ratings (31%).  
 
Effect of number of analogies 
We found that forecasts based on data from experts who could think of two or more (plural) analogies 
were more accurate than those based on data from experts who recalled a single analogy for six of the 
eight conflicts. Accuracy averaged 38% for forecasts derived from single-analogy data, but 56% for those 
derived from plural-analogy data (P = 0.02, one-tailed permutation test for paired replicates).  
 
All else being equal, conflicts with more outcome options are more difficult to forecast than those with 
fewer options. To control for this, we examined the reduction in error versus chance. Forecasts based on 
recall of a single analogy reduced error by an average of 15% compared to chance, while forecasts 
derived from plural analogies reduced error by 39% (Table 3). The difference in error between single-
analogy forecasts and plural-analogy forecasts is P = 0.02 using the one-tailed permutation test for paired 
replicates. The error was reduced by 42% versus chance by accepting data only from experts who 
described three or more analogies. Thus the usefulness of an individual expert was related to the number 
of analogies he described. 
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Table 3 
Accuracy of forecasts by number of analogies 
Percent error reduction versus chance 
a (number of forecasts)  
  None 
b  One only  Two or more 
  Telco Takeover  -33 (8) -33 (5)  -14  (7) 
  55% Pay Plan  -33 (2) 26 (9)  73  (5) 
  Distribution Channel  -19 (5) 0 (6)  50  (6) 
  Artists Protest  -3 (7) -3 (7)  40  (4) 
  Personal Grievance  20 (5) 0 (8)  33  (6) 
  Water Dispute  25 (8) 100 (4) 81  (8) 
  Zenith Investment  25 (6) -12 (4)  25  (4) 
  Nurses Dispute  100 (3) 40 (10) 25  (4) 
Average error reduction       
(unweighted)  
10 (44) 15 (53)  39  (44) 
Average % correct 
(unweighted) 
34 38    56 
 
 
a Bold figures denote the most accurate forecasts for each conflict, and overall. 
b Forecasts from experts we asked to use the structured-analogies method, who 
were unable to think of analogies. We classified these forecasts as unaided-





  16Effect of experts’ familiarity with their analogies  
We expected that the information experts provided would be more useful the more closely involved they 
had been in the analogous situations they identified, because they would be likely to know more about the 
situations. For example, someone who was an adult during the Vietnam War is likely to know more about 
that situation than someone born since, and someone who fought in the war is likely to know more again. 
To examine this, we identified forecasts that had been based on analogies from either experts’ own 
experiences (45) or that of close others (5 forecasts based on the experiences of, for example, a wife or 
brother-in-law). In an unweighted average across the eight conflicts, these direct-experience forecasts 
were more accurate (49%) than the 45 forecasts based on analogies from third-party accounts (37%); P = 
0.07, one-tailed permutation test for paired replicates. Viewed another way, the forecasts based on 
analogies from experiences close to experts reduced the average error across conflicts by 31% (compared 
to chance) while forecasts that were based on indirect experience provided only 13% error reduction. 
 
Familiarity and plural analogies 
The ideal situation when forecasting with structured analogies is to find experts who can think of many 
analogies with which they have had direct experience. When our experts were able to think of two or 
more analogies and they had direct experience with the analogy that was most similar to the target, 
structured-analogies forecasts were 60% accurate (23 forecasts). In other cases, 72 forecasts were 39% 
accurate (P = 0.04, one-tailed permutation test for paired replicates). 
 
Mechanical schemes to derive forecasts 
We wondered whether experts who had used the structured analogies process then provided forecasts that 
were more accurate than unaided experts. They did. Their predictions were on average 42% accurate (94 
forecasts) compared to 32% for unaided-judgment forecasts (P = 0.06, one-tailed permutation test for 
paired replicates). As we anticipated, however, a structured mechanical process was more effective for 
deriving forecasts from the experts’ analogies information than experts’ own judgments. As we have 
  17seen, structured-analogies forecasts were 46% accurate. Why the difference when experts derived their 
own forecasts? Analogies are only useful if they are used. In 22 cases, experts made forecasts that were 
inconsistent with the outcomes of their own analogies; of these, 25% were accurate. When the mechanical 
rule was used to derive forecasts from these experts’ analogies, 45% were accurate.  
 
When experts thought of more that one analogy, our mechanical scheme did not use all of the analogical 
information to make predictions. We tested four alternative approaches in order to determine whether we 
would improve accuracy further if we derived combined forecasts from all of the 210 analogies with 
similarity ratings and implied decisions. For example, if an expert provided information on three 
analogies, for the purpose of testing our four combining alternatives we effectively derived three forecasts 
instead of the one we would have derived using the structured analogies method. 
 
For our first alternative, we used the outcome implied by the most analogies, and obtained an average 
accuracy of 40% across all conflicts, compared to 46% for the approach we had adopted. For the second, 
instead of assuming that the analogies were all of equal value as we did for the first alternative, for each 
conflict we chose the option with the highest total similarity rating as our forecast (39% accurate). For the 
third alternative, we allocated experts’ analogies in proportion to each option’s share of the expert’s 
similarity ratings (40%). For the fourth alternative, we calculated each expert’s average similarity rating 
for each option. We then weighted his analogies by that average as a proportion his total average 
similarity ratings (39%). In sum, all of these alternatives provided forecasts that were less accurate than 
those derived by applying the mechanical scheme that we had specified prior to testing the accuracy of 
structured analogies.  
 
  18Effect of collaboration 
While we had no directional hypothesis about collaboration, we analyzed the data to see whether 
collaboration among experts was useful. When experts using structured analogies collaborated with 
others, their median working time was 45 minutes compared to 30 minutes for those who worked alone. 
(We do not know how much time the collaborators spent on the task, nor do we know the nature of their 
collaboration.) As it happened, those who collaborated claimed to have had much more experience with 
conflict-management (median of 14 years versus 5 years) and experience with similar conflicts (a median 
self-rating of 4.0 out of 10, versus 2.8). Despite the greater investment of resources by more 
knowledgeable experts, collaboration produced no gain in accuracy: forecasts from solo experts were on 
average 44% accurate across conflicts (75 forecasts), compared to 42% for forecasts by collaborating 
experts (22 forecasts).  
 
Given our findings, we saw no need to distinguish between solo and collaborative forecasts in our 
analysis. In view of the time savings, we recommend that structured analogies be done by individuals. 
 
Limitations 
The structured analogies method is useful only in cases in which experts can think of analogies. This 
limitation can be overcome in many situations by identifying people with relevant expertise. While this 
may be difficult to know in advance, one can gauge people’s expertise from their responses – that is, did 
they provide analogies; if so, how many; and did they have direct experience? 
 
Using structured analogies is more costly than using unaided judgment. However, relative to the costs of 
making bad decisions in many conflict situations, such as selecting strategies to achieve peace in the 
Middle East or to deal with threatening behavior by the North Korean government, the costs are 
negligible.  
 
  19Further research 
Research on additional situations would help to better assess the improvements that might be expected, 
and the conditions under which structured analogies is most effective. Our conclusions are based on a 
sample of only eight situations. 
 
This is the first published study on the use of structured analogies. More research needs to be done to 
develop the operational procedures for the method. For example, what is the best way to frame the issues 
for the experts so that they provide more and better analogies? Would a more structured approach to 
rating analogies’ similarity to a target help administrators derive more accurate forecasts? To what extent 
might improvements in accuracy be obtained, in the case of well-documented analogies, by checking the 
facts of the situation and correcting any errors in experts’ matching of analogy outcomes with potential 
target outcomes? 
 
It seems plausible that the Delphi technique could be used to improve assessments of analogies’ similarity 
to a target, potentially increasing accuracy further at a low cost. Rowe and Wright (2001) provide 
evidence on the value of Delphi, and software for implementing of Delphi is provided at 
forecastingprinciples.com. Experts’ confidence ratings may be useful for weighting structured-analogies 
forecasts in a combination (Arkes, 2001). 
 
We have examined conflict situations because of their importance and the difficulty of obtaining useful 
forecasts. Structured analogies might also improve forecasting for situations other than conflicts. We 
expect that it would be most useful where situations are complex and where there are plural analogies. 
 
Research is needed on how to encourage adoption of structured analogies. Currently, people  use unaided 
judgment, a method that is little better than chance, to decide whether to go to war, get a divorce, make a 
  20hostile takeover bid, go on strike, or mount a competitive pricing campaign. Better forecasts would aid 
decision making in such situations. 
 
Conclusions 
It is difficult to forecast decisions made in conflict situations. On average, unaided experts were correct 
for only 32% of their predictions. This was little better than chance at 28%.  
 
For our structured analogies method, the two key criteria for identifying an expert were the number of 
analogies generated, and the presence of direct knowledge about those analogies. When experts produced 
two or more analogies from experience, forecasts from structured analogies were correct for 60% of the 
predictions. Given the importance of forecasts in conflict situations and in other arenas, such 
improvement could have considerable benefits. 
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Subject: Using analogies to predict the outcomes of conflicts 
 
 
Dear Dr _____________ 
 
I am writing to you because you are an expert on _________. I am engaged on a research project on the 
accuracy of different methods for predicting decisions made in conflicts. At this stage, I’m investigating 
the formal use of “analogies” for forecasting. That is, forecasting on the basis of the outcomes of similar 
conflicts that are known to the forecaster. 
 
What I would like you to do is to read the attached descriptions of some real (but disguised) conflict 
situations and to predict the outcome of each conflict. If you can’t read the attachments, please let me 
know and I’ll send the material in your preferred format if I’m able. 
 
Each attached file contains a conflict description and a short questionnaire. Please follow these steps for 
each conflict: 
  1/ Read the description and  
  2/ try to think of several analogous situations and  
  3/ about how similar your analogies are to the conflict.  
  4/ Fill-in the questionnaire (electronically if you can) 
a)  describe your analogies 
b)  rate your analogies 
c)  make your prediction (either pick an outcome or assign probabilities) 
d)  record the total time you spent on all tasks 
e)  return the questionnaire.  
 
One of the objectives of this research is to assess the effect of collaboration on forecast accuracy. You 
have been allocated to the collaboration treatment, so please do discuss these forecasting problems with 
colleagues. Do not, however, discuss them with other people who have received this material as I want 
independent responses from participants. 
 
Although I intend to acknowledge the help of all of the people who assist with this research, my report 
will not associate any prediction with any individual. 
 
Your prompt response is very important to the successful completion of my project. Please help me to 
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1)  (A) In the table below, please briefly describe 
  (i) your analogies,  
    (ii) their source (e.g. your own experience, media reports, history, literature, etc.), and  
    (iii) the main similarities and differences between your analogies and this situation. 
  (B) Rate analogies out of 10 (0 = no similarity… 5 = similar… 10 = high similarity).  
  (C) Enter the responses from question 2 (below) closest to the outcomes of your analogies. 
(A) 





a. Bank takeover                  Personal                         Issue same, industry different  8  C 
b.  Govt Agency merger      Personal                         Takeover same, government, but 
                                                                                       ordered takeover 
4 D 
c.  Facility Merger               Personal/family             Combine similar operations  3  B 
d.    
e.    
 
2)  How was the standoff between Localville and Expander resolved?   (check one 9, or  %)  
a.  Expander’s  takeover  bid  failed  completely        [__] 
  b.  Expander  purchased  Localville’s  mobile  operation  only       [__] 
  c.  Expander’s takeover succeeded at, or close to, their August 14 offer price of $43-per-share    [X_] 
  d.  Expander’s takeover succeeded at a substantial premium over the August 14 offer price     [__] 
 
3) If  you  have  not given a prediction, please state your reasons: 
 
4)  Roughly, how long did you spend on this task? 
{include the time you spent reading the description and instructions}                                      [_1__] hours  
 
5)          How likely is it that taking more time would change your forecast? 
            { 0 = almost no chance (1/100)  …  10 = practically certain (99/100) }             [_0_] 0-10 
 
6)          Do you recognise the actual conflict described in this file?                        Yes [__]       No [X__] 
  If so, please identify it:  [_________________________________________________] 
7)     How many people did you discuss this forecasting problem with?                 [_2___] people 
 
8)      Roughly, how many years experience do you have as a conflict management specialist?   [20+] years 
 
9)       Please rate your experience (out of 10) with conflicts similar to this one              [6____] 0-10 
 
When you have completed this questionnaire, please return 
either this document as an email attachment to…  
or this questionnaire (with your initials at right) by fax to…      Your initials: [_XYZ_] 
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